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Abstract
The randomness from a quantum random number generator (QRNG) relies on the accurate
characterization of its devices. However, device imperfections and inaccurate characterizations can
result in wrong entropy estimation and bias in practice, which highly affects the genuine randomness
generation and may even induce the disappearance of quantum randomness in an extreme case.
Here we experimentally demonstrate a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QRNG based on
time-bin encoding to achieve certified quantum randomness even when the measurement devices
are uncharacterized and untrusted. The MDI-QRNG is randomly switched between the regular
randomness generation mode and a test mode, in which four quantum states are randomly prepared
to perform measurement tomography in real-time. With a clock rate of 25 MHz, the MDI-QRNG
generates a final random bit rate of 5.7 Kbps. Such implementation with an all-fiber setup provides
an approach to construct a fully-integrated MDI-QRNG with trusted but error-prone devices in
practice.
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Random numbers are widely required in a diversity of applications. Based on the funda-
mental laws of quantum physics, quantum random number generators (QRNGs) can produce
true random numbers, which are unpredictable, irreproducible, and unbiased. So far, various
QRNG schemes have been demonstrated including the ones based on beam splitters [1, 2],
photon arrival times [3–5], vacuum fluctuations [6–10], laser phase fluctuations [11–16], and
time-frequency uncertainty [17]. For a review of the subject, one can refer to [18] and
references therein.
A typical QRNG consists of two parts, randomness source and quantum measurement.
For instance, in a simple prepare-and-measure scheme, the particles are prepared in a fixed
quantum state, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉), an eigenstate of the X basis, and then they are measured
in the Z basis, so that the outcomes of ‘0’ and ‘1’ are produced with the equal probability
as raw output data. The central issue in QRNG is entropy estimation, i.e., how much
genuine quantum randomness can be extracted from the raw data. For each conventional
QRNG implementation, all the devices have to be precisely characterized, and with properly
modelling the min-entropy estimation is normally used to quantify the randomness of the
output data [19]. After randomness extraction, final random numbers can be obtained from
the raw data.
In practice, the imperfections of realistic devices and inaccurate characterizations can
result in wrong entropy estimation and bias to the output bits. Such bias problem is very
similar to the adversary scenario in quantum key distribution (QKD), where the intervention
of an eavesdropper may introduce bias to the keys (from the adversary’s point of view). Thus,
in the data analysis of QRNG, one can introduce an adversary to model the bias problem. A
QRNG can be regarded as a local machine packaged in a closed box, and the imperfections
may depend on some variables within the box, which the user is unaware of. The adversary
may not have an access to control the variables directly. However, she has side information
about how the variables evolve, which enables her to predict the working conditions of
the devices and the outcome random numbers to some extent. Though the outcomes may
still seem to be unbiased from the user’s point of view, they are biased conditioned on the
adversary’s system. That is, the adversary might predict the outcomes partially. For some
QRNG applications, especially the ones in cryptography, the drawback could cause security
threats.
In order to effectively solve the problems of device imperfections and inaccurate character-
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FIG. 1. Measurement-device-independent QRNG scheme.
izations, different QRNG protocols have been recently proposed to obtain certified genuine
randomness even when devices are untrusted and uncharacterized [1, 17, 20–22, 24], includ-
ing device-independent QRNGs (DI-QRNGs) and semi-device-independent QRNGs. Not
surprisingly, these concepts and techniques are all originated from QKD. The DI-QRNG pro-
tocol can produce certified randomness based on the violation of Bells inequality [20] without
trusting the quantum devices. However, the DI-QRNG requires efficiency-loophole-free Bell
tests, which makes the experimental implementation rather challenging and inefficient [20].
In practice, there is a trade-off between system security and performance. By adding a few
reasonable assumptions to the quantum devices, the DI-QRNG becomes much more practi-
cal [1, 22, 24], which is called semi-device-independent QRNG scheme. For instance, Lunghi
et al. have demonstrated a self-testing QRNG experiment with general device assumptions
such as bounded dimensions without relying on detailed characterizations [21]. Cao et al.
have proposed and experimentally realized a source-independent QRNG based on entropic
uncertainty relation of X and Z basis measurement given trusted measurement devices [24].
Similarly, one may ask an interesting question: whether it is possible to generate genuine
quantum randomness when the measurement devices are uncharacterized and untrusted?
The answer to this question leads to the emergence of measurement-device-independent
QRNG (MDI-QRNG) proposals [1, 22]. Considering the duality of state preparation and
measurement and using the idea similar to source-independent QRNG scheme [24], given an
assumption of trusted source part the MDI-QRNG is randomly switched between regular
randomness generation mode and a test mode, in which different input states are randomly
prepared to test the reliability of the measurement devices in real-time [1]. In such a way,
quantum random numbers can be generated even with uncharacterized and untrusted mea-
surement devices.
MDI-QRNG protocol. The MDI-QRNG protocol is described in Fig 1. The quantum
states emitted from the trusted randomness source are measured by untrusted devices with
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a binary output ‘0’ or ‘1’. In the generation mode, a fixed state |+〉 is sent. The user
randomly chooses N0 out of total N turns as test mode, in which the source randomly emits
quantum states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |+i〉 (|+i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉)) as test states to perform a
measurement tomography. Here, |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |+i〉 are the eigenstates of Pauli matrices
σz, σz, σx and σy, respectively. In order to choose both the test mode and prepared test
states, random number seeds are required. Therefore, it it crucial to guarantee that the
randomness generation is larger than the randomness consumption.
The key idea of the scheme is self-testing, that is, it can be tested out whether the
output random numbers are reliable according to the tomography results. We model the
measurement using a qubit positive-operator valued measure (POVM) [25],
F0 = a0(I + ~n0 · ~σ),
F1 = a1(I + ~n1 · ~σ),
(1)
where F0 and F1 are the measurement outputs ‘0’ and ‘1’, respectively, ~σ = (σx, σy, σz) is the
Pauli matrix vector, ~n0 = (nx, ny, nz) and ~n1 are real number vectors. In the experiment,
given the four test states, the probability of output ‘0’ (‘1’) and the POVM parameters a0,
nx, ny, and nz, can be evaluated, which are then used for randomness quantification of the
raw data. The details are shown in Supplemental Material.
In the model of MDI-QRNG, the adversary can let her ancillary photons correlated with
the photons emitted from the source, and she can perform a measurement on her ancillary
photons to extract information about the output random numbers. We can classify the
adversary into a classical one or a quantum one according to her ability. Compared with a
classical adversary who can only perform individual measurement on each ancillary photon,
a quantum adversary has the ability of performing joint measurement. That is, she can
store her ancillary photons in a quantum memory and then a measurement is performed
together [26], which enlarges her side information compared with the classical scenario. In
this paper, the randomness quantification is evaluated against a classical adversary, while
the randomness quantification against a quantum adversary is different and deserves future
work for clarification.
Experimental setup. The time-bin encoding MDI-QRNG setup is shown in Fig. 2. Phase-
randomized narrow optical pulses created from a 1550 nm laser diode (LD) with a clock
rate of 25 MHz are entered into an unbalanced interferometer with a time delay of 9.6
4
ns to form two time-bin pulses. The output port of the interferometer is connected with a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS) via a polarization controller (PC). The PBS output is further
modulated by two polarization-maintaining components, i.e., an amplitude modulator (AM)
and a phase modulator (PM), which are controlled by a field-programmable gate array
(FPGA), to prepare four time-bin quantum states of |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |+i〉.
FIG. 2. Experimental setup of MDI-QRNG including the trusted source (a) and the Z basis
measurement part (b). During the verification process of prepared quantum states, the measure-
ment part is reconfigured when X and Y basis measurement are performed (c). LD: laser diode,
FPGA: field-programmable gate array, BS: beam splitter, PC: polarization controller, PBS: polar-
izing beam splitter, AM: amplitude modulator, PM: phase modulator, ATT: attenuator, SPAD:
single-photon avalanche diode, TDC: time-to-digital converter.
For Z basis measurement as shown in Fig. 2(b), photons emitted from the ATT out-
put port (Port3) are detected by a fully integrated 1.25 GHz InGaAs/InP single-photon
avalanche diode (SPAD) based on the technique of sine wave gating [27], with a detection
efficiency of ∼ 25%. The gate signals of the SPAD are synchronized with the laser pulses
and the detection signals are further measured by a time-to-digital converter (TDC). When
X (Y ) basis measurement is required, the configuration in the measurement part is changed
as Fig. 2(c). Port3 is connected with Port2 via an additional PM (PM2), so that emitted
photons from the ATT reenter into the interferometer and photons at Port1 are finally de-
tected by the SPAD. Such configuration greatly simplifies the experimental setup without
requiring additional unbalanced interferometer and auxiliary phase stabilization.
Typical intensity traces of four time-bin states observed in an oscilloscope are plotted in
Fig. 3, in which a high-speed photodetector is used instead of the SPAD and the attenuator
is set as the minimal value. Given that a laser pulse is entered into the unbalanced inter-
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ferometer, two time-bin pulses, i.e., an early pulse and a late pulse, are created. When the
early (late) pulse is removed by the AM, the state of |0〉 (|1〉) is prepared, see the upper
(middle) trace in Fig. 3(a). When both of the pulses are attenuated by half due to the AM
and meanwhile the relative phase of the early pulse is set as 0 (pi
2
) due to the PM1, the state
of |+〉 (|+i〉) is prepared. However, from the intensity traces observed in the oscilloscope
|+〉 and |+i〉 states cannot be distinguished, see the lower trace in Fig. 3(a). To further
distinguish |+〉 and |+i〉, the measurement part is configured as Fig. 2(c), and the phase of
PM2 set as 0 (pi
2
) corresponds to X (Y ) basis measurement. Fig. 3(b) shows the intensity
difference in two cases when the phase of PM2 is 0, where the state of |+〉 (|+i〉) produces
constructive (intermediate) interference.
To further verify the prepared states, the intensities of the time-bin pulses are attenuated
to single-photon level via an attenuator (ATT) and the optimal mean photon number is set
as ∼ 0.06 according to the theoretical model of MDI-QRNG [1]. The time-bin states are
then projected to X , Y and Z basis, respectively, and the measured results are shown in
Fig. 4, in which low error rates indicate the accuracy of the prepared quantum states. These
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FIG. 3. Intensity traces of four prepared states of |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |+i〉 observed in an oscilloscope
(a). The measurement part is configured as Fig. 2(b) whilst the attenuator is set as the minimal
value and a high-speed photodetector is used instead of the SPAD. Early and late time-bin pulses
at T0 and T1 correspond to the states of |1〉 and |0〉, respectively. When both of the early and late
pulses are attenuated by half and the phase of the early pulse is set as 0 (pi2 ) by PM1, the state of
|+〉 (|+i〉) is prepared. However, the intensity traces in two cases are exactly the same. To further
distinguish the two states, the measurement part is configured as Fig. 2(c). When the phase of
PM2 is set as 0, |+〉 and |+i〉 produces constructive and intermediate interferences, respectively
(b).
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FIG. 4. The measured error rates of four prepared quantum states in the three orthogonal basis.
error rates include the minor contributions due to the dark counts and afterpulses [28] of
the InGaAs/InP SPAD.
In the implementation process of the MDI-QRNG protocol, the source is operated either
in generation mode or in test mode, whilst the measurement part is fixed at Z basis. In
generation mode, fixed |+〉 state is sent and after the Z basis measurement random bit ‘0’
or ‘1’ is generated. In test mode, four states are randomly sent with equal probability to
perform measurement tomography. A large amount of random numbers are stored inside
the FPGA in prior to determine which mode and which state to prepare for each laser pulse.
In order to finally gain output randomness higher than input randomness, the proportion
of generation mode is much larger than that of test mode.
In each round of the MDI-QRNG process, 234 quantum states in total including 215 test
states are sent. For each test state, 34 random bits are used to determine its position
in the sequence and further 2 bits are used to determine the state to be prepared. The
detection information (no-click, ‘0’ or ‘1’) of each quantum state is recorded. Therefore,
each round consumes 1152 Kbits of random numbers and produces 16 Gbits of raw data. In
the experiment, the MDI-QRNG process is performed for 100 rounds in total, so that around
115 Mbits of random numbers are consumed and 1600 Gbits of raw data are produced. The
amount of prepared test states is 3.3 × 106 and their measurement tomography results are
listed in Table I.
Here we briefly introduce the randomness quantification, see Supplemental Material for
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TABLE I. Results of measurement tomography.
Test state Amount Counts of ‘1’ Probability
|0〉 820318 121 1.48 × 10−4
|1〉 818254 13067 1.60 × 10−2
|+〉 819125 6431 7.85 × 10−3
|+i〉 819103 6403 7.82 × 10−3
details. In the generation mode, based on the tomography results the lower bound of ran-
domness against classical adversary is quantified with min-entropy [1]
R(F0, F1) ≥ 2a0H∞
(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
)
, (2)
which is also suited for high-dimensional POVMs and the scenario that the adversary per-
forms different POVMs for different turns. A practical MDI-QRNG system suffers two main
problems, statistical fluctuation and imperfect qubit source. Note that other experimental
imperfections such as transmission loss are also included in the form of POVM. We simply
follow Ref. [1] to address these two issues.
The number of total turns is finite and the statistical fluctuations should be taken into
consideration, i.e., the measurement tomography may not be accurate due to the finite data
effect. Given the test state ρi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), i.e., ρ1 = |0〉〈0|, ρ2 = |1〉〈1|, ρ3 = |+〉〈+| and
ρ4 = |+i〉〈+i|, let Ni be the number of test turns, N0 be the number of generation turns,
and pi (p
′
i) be the probability of output ‘0’ in test (generation) turns. The key point of
the statistical fluctuation analysis is to use pi (measured value) to bound the parameter p
′
i.
When the data size is large enough, p′i ≈ pi. In the finite data case, there is a deviation
between pi and p
′
i, denoted by θi. Given the number of turns Ni (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), θi is a
function of pi.
In the experiment, a weak coherent state source is used, which is, however, an imperfect
qubit source. Given a coherent state source with an intensity of µ, after phase randomiza-
tion, it becomes a mixture of photon number states following a Poisson distribution. Such
imperfection would affect the final randomness evaluation by [1]
R(F0, F1) ≥ min
a0,ny,nz
2a0(1 + µ)
eµ
H
(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
)
, (3)
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FIG. 5. The NIST test results of the final random data with a size of 390 Mbits. Given an item,
when the p-value (column) and the proportion (dot) are more than 0.01 and 0.98, respectively, it
means that the random data pass the item.
with constraints |nx|2 + |ny|2 + |nz|2 = 1, 0 ≤ a0 ≤ 1, and
(a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p1 ± θ1 ≤ (a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ
+ 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ ≤ p2 ± θ2 ≤ (a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ
+ 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p3 ± θ3 ≤ (a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e−µ
+ 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p4 ± θ4 ≤ (a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e−µ
+ 1− eµ − µe−µ.
(4)
We make a worst-case assumption that the multi-photon components can be fully manipu-
lated by the untrusted measurement devices and thus cannot generate output randomness.
In such a way, the source intensity µ can be optimized for the output randomness from
Eq. (3).
Employing the analysis method shown in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) for the experimental results
shown in Table I, the min-entropy of the MDI-QRNG is lower-bounded by 2.3 × 10−4 bit
per pulse. For randomness extraction, a Toeplitz-matrix hash function is applied. The final
random number generation rate is 5.7 Kbps. We finally obtain 390 Mbit random numbers,
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which are 3.4 times larger than the amount of randomness consumed as seeds. In order to
verify the quality of the final random bits, the standard NIST statistical tests are applied [29].
Clearly, the final random bits pass all the test items as shown in Fig. 5.
In summary, we experimentally realize a practical measurement-device-independent quan-
tum random number generator using time-bin encoding. The output randomness against
classical adversary can be certified and quantified, even when the measurement devices are
uncharacterized and untrusted. After randomness quantification, the min-entropy of MDI-
QRNG reaches 2.3× 10−4 bits per pulse, corresponding to final random number generation
rate of 5.7 Kbps. Moreover, the ratio of random number generation to random number con-
sumption is 3.4. This all-fiber experimental setup exhibits the feasibility of constructing a
fully-integrated and compact MDI-QRNG with trusted but error-prone devices in practice.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL: EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-
INDEPENDENT QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
Measurement tomography
The security analysis of the experiment is mainly based on the previous theoretical
work [1]. In this section, we summarize the key step of the analysis: measurement to-
mography.
The user prepares (trusted) qubit states for the (untrusted) measurement device, which
outputs bits ‘0’ and ‘1’. In practice, if the device outputs other signals, such as losses
and double clicks, the user directly assigns the bit ’0’. From the user’s point of view, the
measurement is a qubit POVM though the actual POVM may be high-dimensional. In fact,
it can be proved that in order to let the user obtain the least randomness, the best strategy
for an adversary is a qubit POVM [1]. An arbitrary qubit POVM can be expressed as
F0 = a0(I + ~n0 · ~σ)
F1 = a1(I + ~n1 · ~σ),
(5)
where the coefficients a0 and a1 are real numbers and ~n0 and ~n1 are real vectors satisfying
a0, a1 ≥ 0
a0 + a1 = 1
|n0|, |n1| ≤ 1
a0~n0 + a1~n1 = 0.
(6)
The probabilities of output bits ‘0’ and ‘1’ given an input state ρ are
P (0|ρ) = tr(F0ρ)
P (1|ρ) = tr(F1ρ).
(7)
When the input states are |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |+i〉, the corresponding probabilities of output
bit ‘0’ are
p1 = P (0
∣∣|0〉〈0|) = a0 + a0nz
p2 = P (0
∣∣|1〉〈1|) = a0 − a0nz
p3 = P (0
∣∣|+〉〈+|) = a0 + a0nx
p4 = P (0
∣∣|+i〉〈+i|) = a0 + a0ny,
(8)
12
where pi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be estimated in the experiment. From Eq. (8), one can find
that the number of unknown parameters is equal to that of equations. Therefore, the
POVM parameters a0, nx, ny, and nz can be calculated and the measurement tomography
is accomplished.
Data analysis
For a qubit source, the lower bound of randomness against a classical adversary is given
by [1]
R(F0, F1) ≥ 2a0H∞
(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
)
, (9)
which is for the asymptotic case with infinite data size.
In the experiment, the data size is finite, and hence statistical fluctuations should be
taken into consideration. That is, the measurement tomography may not be accurate due
to the finite key effect. Let Ni be the number of turns with input state ρi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in
the test turns and N0 be the number of generation turns, where ρ1 = |0〉〈0|, ρ2 = |1〉〈1|,
ρ3 = |+〉〈+| and ρ4 = |+i〉〈+i|. Let pi (p′i) be the conditional probability of output ‘0’ in
test (generation) turns given input states ρi. pi can be used to estimate p
′
i. In the case
of finite data, there is a deviation θi between pi and p
′
i, which decreases as the data size
increases. Similar to the phase error estimation in quantum key distribution (QKD), the
failure probability ǫθ in our estimation is given by [2]
ǫθ = P (p
′
i > pi + θi) ≤
4
√
Ni +N0√
NiN0(1 + pi)(1− pi)
2−(Ni+N0)ξi(θi), (10)
where ξi(θi) is defined as
ξi(θi) = H(
1 + pi
2
+
N0θi
N0 +Ni
)− NiH((1 + pi)/2) +N0H((1 + pi)/2 + θi)
N0 +Ni
. (11)
The statistical fluctuation θi can be calculated given the values of Ni and ǫθ. In the worst
case, a0, ny and nz should take the lower bound values,
ny =
2p4 − 2θ4
p1 + p2 + θ1 + θ2
− 1,
nz =
2p1 − 2θ1
p1 + p2 + θ1 + θ2
− 1,
a0 =
p1 + p2 − θ1 − θ2
2
.
(12)
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Then, the parameters ny,nz and a0 are substituted into Eq. (9) to calculate the randomness
lower bound.
In the experiment, a coherent state source rather than a qubit source is used. The photon
number follows a Poisson distribution. After phase randomization, the state becomes a Fock
state mixture. The source contains three kind of components, i.e., vacuum, single photon
and multi-photon. In such case, the corresponding randomness is lower bounded by
R(F0, F1) ≥ min
a0,ny,nz
2a0(1 + µ)
eµ
H
(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
)
, (13)
where the minimization of a0, ny and nz is due to the fact that statistical fluctuations are
considered. These parameters cannot be obtained directly from the experiment. Instead,
they can be estimated.
Here, we take the worst-case assumption that the multi-photon (bad) component cannot
generate any randomness. Also, we follow the argument that the vacuum and single photon
(good) part can be regarded as an effective single photon when performing the tomogra-
phy [1]. The probability of output bit ‘0’ given the four input test states ρi are
p(0|ρi) = (1 + µ)e−µPi + (1− eµ − µe−µ)P ′i , (14)
where Pi and P
′
i are the probabilities of output bit ‘0’ when the input state comes from the
good and bad parts, respectively. By letting P ′i be ‘0’ or ‘1’, we can derive the constraints,
(a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p1 ≤ (a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ ≤ p2 ≤ (a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p3 ≤ (a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ,
(a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p4 ≤ (a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ.
(15)
Further, we take account of statistical fluctuations in Eq. (15). Given the failure prob-
ability ǫθ and the number of turns Ni (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), θi can be calculated by letting the
inequality in Eq. (10) be an equation. Then, we have the following constraints,
(a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p1 ± θ1 ≤ (a0 + a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ
(a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ ≤ p2 ± θ2 ≤ (a0 − a0nz)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ
(a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p3 ± θ3 ≤ (a0 + a0nx)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ
(a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ p4 ± θ4 ≤ (a0 + a0ny)(1 + µ)e−µ + 1− eµ − µe−µ.
(16)
14
In the data post-processing, one needs to numerically solve the minimization problem of
Eq. (13) with the constraints in Eq. (16). Also, from Eq. (13) one can optimize the source
intensity µ. In the experiment, the optimal value is around µ = 0.06.
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